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Maher argues that the decision in Farrell is analogous to this case because the
employee in Farrell was also injured in an office. The Third Circuit distinguished this
case from Farrell because unlike the employee in Farrell, Respondent actually left the
office, whereas the employee in Farrell did not engage in activity in the pier or yard, and
he did not act as a checker on the dock.
Respondent cited Levins v. Benefits Review Board, 724 F.2d 4, 7 ( l st Cir. 1 984)
where the court looked at the "actual nature of the employee's regularly assigned duties
as a whole" emphasizing the need to examine the totality of employee's job. Respondent
also cited Caputo where coverage was granted to workers that spend "at least some of
their time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432 U. S. at 2 73. The Third
Circuit also considered the approach followed by other courts, where coverage was
granted to an employee who spent anywhere from two and a half to five percent of his
time performing longshore activities. Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co. , 632 F.2d 1 346
(5th Cir. 1 980).
The Third Circuit found that respondent's employment was similar to that of the
employees in Levins and Boudloche because he spent 50% of his time employed in a
position covered by the act. The Third Circuit concluded the proper analysis would be to
use the test in Levins requiring the court to look at the "regular portion of the overall
tasks to which the claimant could have been assigned as a matter of course" (Levins, 724
F.2d at 9), in conjunction with the rule from Caputo, to assess whether the employee
works 'at least some of the time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432
U S. at 2 73. The Third Circuit held that respondent was in fact covered under the Act
due to the amount of time spent working as a checker in addition to his overall duties
including the subjection to assignment as a checker even though at the time of the injury
respondent was not working in his capacity in a maritime employee.
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PROPORTIONATE SHARE APPROACH D ISALLOWS
CONTRI BUTI ON CLAIMS
A defendant in an admiralty tort action who settles with the plaintiff cannot bring a
contribution sui t against a non-settling defendant who has not been released from
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement agreement.
Murphy v. Fla. Keys Elec. Coop. Ass'n
United States Court of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit
329 F.3d 1 3 1 1
(Decided May 9, 2003)
Shortly after midnight on July 25, 2000, Raymond Ashman IV ("Raymond") and
his two friends Brendan and Steven Murphy went out in a boat owned by Raymond's
father to take advantage o f the start o f annual lobster mini-season. The voyage came to an
abrupt end. The boat, piloted by Raymond, crashed into an "electric pole abutment
support structure" owned by defendant, Florida Keys Electric Co-op Association, Inc.
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("Florida Keys"). As a result, Brendan Murphy was killed while both Steven Murphy
and Raymond were injured.
The parents of Brendan and Steven ("Murphys") brought a wrongful death suit
against Florida Keys in federal district court under admiralty jurisdiction. No suit was
brought against the Ashmans. Florida Keys also invoked the federal court's admiralty
jurisdiction in filing a third-party complaint against the Ashmans, claiming that it was
entitled to contribution from the Ashmans for liability it incurred to the Murphys. In
response, the Ashmans filed a counterclaim against Florida Keys for their son's injuries
as a civil action under the supplemental jurisdiction of the district court. Later, the
Ashmans filed a suit against Florida Keys to recover for their son's injuries in state court.
While all of the actions were pending, Florida Keys settled its wrongful death suit
with the Murphys. However, the terms of the settlement agreement failed to include a
provision releasing the Ashmans from liability against claims brought by the Murphys.
As a result, the Ashmans moved for summary judgment on Florida Keys' third party
contribution claim. The Ashmans argued that since Florida Keys' failed to included a
condition in the settlement agreement releasing them from liability, Flordia Keys could
no longer maintain a contribution claim against them. The district court agreed, granting
the Ashmans' motion for summary judgment on the third party contribution claim
brought by Florida Keys and dismissed without prejudice the Ashman's counterclaim
against Florida Keys.
Following this decision, Florida Keys appealed the summary judgment granted
against its contribution claim and the dismissal without prejudice of the Ashman' s
counterclaim. Regarding the summary judgment, Florida Keys argued that the Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1 575 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 992)
decision should be followed, whereby the pro tanto approach enables a settling defendant
to sue a non-settling defendant for contribution. However, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit found that the Great Lakes decision was not the applicable approach.
Instead, the court referred to the holding of McDermott, Inc. v. A m Cfyde, 5 1 1 U.S. 202
( 1 994), whereby the proportionate share approach applied.
According to the proportionate share approach, when a non-settling defendant
goes to trial and the amount of damages and corresponding liability percentage is
calculated, the defendant is only responsible for its proportion of damages as determined
in the trial verdict. The court further held that in settling with the plaintiff, Florida Keys
assumed the risk of misjudging the amount of damages the court would calculate as its
share. The Ashmans did not assume any such risk and therefore if the Murphys got
larger damages from Florida Keys than if they had gone to trial, such discrepancy does
not provide the Ashmans with less potential damages liability. As applied to Florida
Keys ' claim for contribution against the Ashmans, the court held that the decision in
Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc. , 809 F.2d 1 529, 1 53 1 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 987) is binding and
therefore Florida Keys must pay the damages as settled and cannot sue the non-settling
Ashmans for contribution of any portion of those damages.
The remaining issue on appeal by Florida Keys was the dismissal without
prejudice o f the Ashmans' suit. Here, the Court of Appeals held that upon the granting of
the Ashmans summary judgment motion against Florida Keys' contribution claim, the
court had the ability to dismiss the counterclaim filed by the Ashmans. The court relied
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 3 1 (a), whereby Florida Keys ' filing of a third-
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party counterclai m against the Ashmans placed the Ashrnans' maritime tort claim within
the court's jurisdiction as a compulsory counterclaim because the claim arose under the
same occurrence or transaction. Therefore, overall the court affirmed the holding of the
District Court.
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EXCULPATORY CLAUS E ABSOLVIN G PARTY
FROM ITS OWN NEGL IGENCE H EL D VALID
An exculpatory agreement that shifted the risk of loss to the b oat owner and
released the Yacht Club from all liab ility, including that liability arising from its
own negligence will be held valid where the terms of the agreement are clearly and
uneq uivocally defined.
Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs.
United States Court of Appeals For The E ighth Circui t
334 F .3d 7 1 2
(Decided J uly 1 , 2003)
Appelles filed a negligence claim against the appellant, the Yacht Club of St.
Louis ("Yacht Club") after its boats was destroyed in a fire at the club. The Yacht Club
argued that the exculpatory clause in the boat owners' slip rental agreement released it
from liability even if it was due to the Yacht Club's own negligence. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted recovery to the boat owners.
On Appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed.
Ronald and Martha Jessup owned a houseboat that was kept at the Yacht Club
mari na. Mr. Jessup noticed a fuel leak near the engine fuel pump and requested the
Yacht Club to assist him in the repairs. The Yacht Club then referred Mr. Jessup to Mr.
Shulte a mai ntenance worker for the Yacht Club who i nstalled a new fuel pump. Three
days later Mr. Jessup started the engine; shortly after he heard an explosion and watched
as flames engulfed the hatch area where the engi nes were located. F ire engulfed the boat
and then spread to other docks in the marina destroying the appelle's boats.
Following the fire, the Jessups brought an action for declaratory j udgment in
district court seeking to exonerate or limit their liability for all claims arisi ng from the
incident. Each of the boat owners filed claims against both Jessups and the Yacht Club,
while the Yacht Club and the J essups fi led claims against each other. The claims against
the Yacht Club were based on the theory that Mr. Shutle negligently installed the fuel
pump which caused the fire, and that the Y acht Club was liable for assuring that Mr.
Shulte was quali fi ed to perfonn the repair, when in fact he was not.
The Yacht Club defended against the boat owners by asserting that an exculpatory
clause pri nted on the back of each boat owner's slip agreement exonerated it from any
liability for damages caused by the fire.
In reversi ng the district cou11's decision, the Court of Appeals discussed four
main issues ( I ) whether the exculpatory clause is valid, (2) whether the exculpatory

19

